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PHISHING FOR COMPUTER FRAUD INSURANCE 
COVERAGE 
 
Stephen Swanson

INTRODUCTION 
 
“Insurance is the only product that both the seller and buyer hope 
is never actually used.”1 This quotation certainly has merit, but the 
proliferation of technology in recent decades and the associated risks 
to sensitive business data are making insurance coverage claims a 
necessity as cyber threats continue to rise.2 Cyber threats involve 
“persons who attempt unauthorized access to a [computer] system 
device and/or network using a data communications pathway[, and] 
[t]his access can be directed from within an organization by trusted 
users or from remote locations by unknown persons using the 
[i]nternet.”3 Cyber threats originate from many sources,4 but in the 
insurance litigation arena, courts across the country are struggling to 
interpret the proper coverage for monetary business losses pursuant 
to phishing attacks.5 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to my family and friends 
for your continued support over the past four years. Thank you to Professors Diamond and Bracker for 
your guidance and feedback during the process of writing this Note. Finally, thank you to my Law 
Review colleagues for your invaluable diligence in editing and publishing this note. 
1. Life Insurance, SUMMIT FIN. CONSULTING, http://summitfc.net/services/insurance/life-insurance 
[https://perma.cc/2JWP-FBYL] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (quoting unknown author). 
2. J. Clement, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United States from 
2005 to 2018 (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breaches- 
recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/ [https://perma.cc/W398- 
CJC5] (last updated Aug. 5, 2019) (“The number of data breaches and the number of exposed records in 
the U.S. have reached the highest figures to date in 2017 [with] [n]early 179 million records . . . exposed 
in the U.S. in 2017, whereas the number of data breaches in the country added up to 1,579 that year.”). 
3. Cyber Threat Source Descriptions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND CISA CYBER + INFRASTRUCTURE, 
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat-source-descriptions [https://perma.cc/4NMX-S3EH] 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019). 
4. Id. Various threats to computer systems include bot-network operators, criminal groups, foreign 
intelligence services, hackers, insiders, phishers, spammers, spyware/malware authors, and terrorists. Id. 
5. J. Robert MacAneney et al., 2 Circuit Court Rulings Rock Phishing Loss Coverage Field, LAW 
360 (July 26, 2018, 3:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1067338/2-circuit-court-rulings-rock- 
phishing-loss-coverage-field [https://perma.cc/NP4D-C5R3] (“[Recent] decisions create a bona fide 
circuit split on the issue of whether a ‘phishing’ . . . scheme comes within the computer fraud coverage 
part of a crime/fidelity policy.”). 
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Generally, phishing entails “attempt[s] by an individual or group  
to solicit personal information from unsuspecting users by employing 
social engineering techniques [that] are crafted to appear as if they 
have been sent from a legitimate organization or known individual.”6 
Phishing attacks proceed quickly with minimal exposure to the 
cybercriminal.7 For example, France-based Etna Industrie was 
targeted when the company president contacted its accountant 
regarding a “very confidential” acquisition of a company in Cyprus.8 
The president instructed that a lawyer supporting the transaction 
would make contact with details of where to wire the funds for the 
purchase.9 Within one hour, and after about ten urgent emails and 
several phone calls, the accountant had wired €500,000 to foreign 
bank accounts.10 While the accountant seemingly acted in accordance 
with the business’s needs, the president’s communication, the 
external lawyer, and the confidential transaction were actually all a 
fraudulent phishing attack aimed at rapidly excising funds from Etna 
Industrie with little or no paper trail.11 
Following a successful phishing attack, businesses seek to recoup 
these losses and turn to their cyber insurance policy or the computer 
fraud provision of their crime insurance policy.12 Oftentimes, 
 
 
6. Report Phishing Sites, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY CISA CYBER + INFRASTRUCTURE, 
https://www.us-cert.gov/report-phishing [https://perma.cc/CGL2-8J8P] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019). 
Usually in the form of emails, phishing “often attempt[s] to entice users to click on a link that will take 
the user to a fraudulent website that appears legitimate [or] to provide personal information, such as 
account usernames and passwords, that can further expose them to future compromises.” Id. Accord 
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Phishing: The Legal Challenges for Business, 24 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 2, 2 (2005) (“Phishing attacks take advantage of customer trust in a company’s identity and 
brand names . . . [and] they do serious damage to the company’s reputation, as well as undermine 
confidence in online commerce generally.”). 
7. Marie Keyworth & Matthew Wall, The ‘Bogus Boss’ Email Scam Costing Firms Millions, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35250678 [https://perma.cc/ZKA4-MMX9]. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Social Engineering Fraud, ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER & CO., https://www.wasb.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2017/04/20161219_ajgallagher_social_engineering_fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR23- 
99XX] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Social Engineering Fraud] (“Many insureds assume that 
theft of funds through social engineering fraud would be covered under a cyber liability policy or a 
crime insurance policy’s computer/funds transfer fraud extension; however, insurers have generally 
denied coverage under both policies.”). 
2
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however, the insurer denies coverage under latter provisions, and 
litigation ensues.13 Courts faced with this insurance coverage issue 
are split on whether phishing attacks result in a direct loss of money 
that should be covered under a computer fraud provision of a crime 
insurance policy.14 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits side with the insurers 
in denying coverage under similar computer fraud provisions.15 The 
Second and Sixth Circuits have found direct losses and sustain 
coverage in favor of the insureds, whereas the Eleventh Circuit is 
divided.16 
Accordingly, the following note discusses the disparity between 
the federal circuit courts regarding the proper insurance coverage for 
phishing-type attacks. Part I examines the cyber threats companies 
face when handling sensitive transactions and customer data, as well 
as the coverage gap between traditional crime insurance policies and 
the targeted cyber insurance policies that help prevent, detect, and 
ultimately mitigate the damages resulting from a cybersecurity 
breach.17 Part II analyzes the current circuit split and the various 
 
 
13. Id. 
14. MacAneney, supra note 5. 
15. Id. 
16. Id.; Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2018); 
Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at *5 (N.D. 
Ga. Aug. 30, 2016); Success Healthcare v. Zurich Am. Ins., No. 9:14-81423-CIV, 2015 WL 11439019, 
at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:14-CV-81423, 2015 WL 
11438207 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2015). 
17. Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security Insurance: Navigating the Landscape of a 
Growing Field, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 379, 390–91 (2014) (“The various types 
of coverage offered under cyber-security insurance policies include coverage for: 
 Data breach/privacy crisis management: expenses related to the management 
of a cyber-security incident, including the investigation, remediation, data 
subject notification, call management, credit checking for data subjects, legal 
costs, court attendance and regulatory fines; 
 Business/Network Interruption: loss of net profit that was caused by a material 
interruption to the insured’s network, due to a cyber-attack or a network 
security breach; 
 Multimedia/Media liability: third-party damages which can include 
defacement of a website, infringement of intellectual property rights or 
negligence relating to electronic content; 
 Extortion liability: losses due to a threat of extortion and professional fees 
related to terminating an external threat; 
 Network security liability: third-party damages resulting from denial of access 
to a system, costs related to data stored with third-party suppliers and costs 
related to the theft of data on third-party systems; 
3
Swanson: Phishing for Computer Fraud Insurance Coverage
Published by Reading Room, 2020
410 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 
 
 
contract interpretation strategies, policy considerations, and tests 
employed in reaching a coverage decision. Part III proposes a 
resolution to the overarching circuit split that will provide more 
clarity and predictability to victims of phishing attacks and the 
insurance companies they employ. 
 
I. Background 
Scams and schemes are not new phenomena in human history.18 
They have traditionally varied in sophistication,19 but the rise  of 
cyber threats in recent years is so pervasive that the public likely has 
already “been hacked” or they just “don’t [yet] know [that] they’ve 
been hacked.”20 The insurance market responded to these threats in 
1997 with its first iteration of cyber insurance policies.21 Initially 
covering only third-party liability, insurers soon realized that a 
significant amount of data breaches originated from within 
companies, so the policies expanded in kind to include first-party 
liability coverage to the affected company.22 Further developments in 
 
 Reputational Injury: third-party damages from disparagement or privacy 
violations caused by breach of the insured’s system; 
 Conduit Injury: damages to customers’ systems affected by breach of the 
insured’s system; 
 Disclosure Injury: damages to individuals caused by the unauthorized access 
of their private information held on the insured’s system.”); 
Jason Tashea, Are You Covered, 104 A.B.A. J. 30, 31 (2018) (discussing the insurance coverage gap 
between law firm’s computer fraud coverage policy and general cyber insurance policies). 
18. Linton Weeks, How Scams Worked in the 1800s, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 12, 2015, 7:03 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/npr-history-dept/2015/02/12/385310877/how-scams-worked-in-the-1800s 
[https://perma.cc/ES9W-KQHT] (detailing “the Golden Age of schemes” and the rise of the so-called 
“confidence man” or “con man”). 
19. Jean Braucher & Barak Orbach, Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man, 27 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 249, 250 (2015) (“Familiar [con] examples include telemarketing frauds, fraudulent 
charities, pyramid and Ponzi schemes, work-from-home schemes, quack medicines, home repair scams, 
and Nigerian scams.”). 
20. Barbarians at the Digital Gate, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323701904578275920521747756 
[https://perma.cc/5U47-PQB5]. 
21. Brian D. Brown, The Ever-Evolving Nature of Cyber Coverage, INS. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-features/2014/09/22/340633.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6ABU-N7QS]. 
22. Id. 
[T]he original policies covered only third party suits arising from breaches originating 
from outside the company. However, studies at the time showed that over half of all 
data breaches originated from inside the company from rogue and disgruntled 
4
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the cyber insurance arena seemingly came about in response to 
evolving cyber threats and businesses looking to be made whole for 
revenue interruption, digital investigations, and public relations 
expenses.23 Still, businesses struggle “to stay ahead of criminals and 
stop old cat and mouse games” in an age when information security 
is increasingly vulnerable.24 Targeted cyber threats, coupled with 
limited options for business recovery, have created a gap that courts 
nationwide are grappling to fill. 
 
A. Cyber Threats 
The social engineering attack is prominent among the cyber threats 
facing businesses.25 This involves “manipulat[ing] . . . a victim’s 
understanding    of     a     transaction . . . so     that     they 
unwittingly . . . provide the thief with funds or information.”26 Under 
the social engineering umbrella, group and spear phishing attacks 
target businesses with demonstrated success.27 
 
 
 
 
 
Id. 
23. Id. 
employees. The markets offering coverage at that time responded by broadening 
coverage to cover loss to the entity, but coverage for loss from the malicious 
employee was excluded. 
24. COMBATING UNAUTHORIZED REMOTE NETWORK ACCESS AND EMBEDDED MALICIOUS CODE, 
WARREN GORHAM & LAMONT, 2010 WL 865796. 
25. PETER TRIM & DAVID UPTON, COUNTERACTING CYBER THREATS THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEARNING AND TRAINING § 2.2 (2013) (ebook) (“Social Engineering has been defined in numerous 
ways. The best definition is an enemy who manipulates or uses psychological tricks to gain the 
confidence of an authorized network employee relying on the natural human tendency to trust and help 
others. While there may be internal, disgruntled enemies within your organizational system, the external 
enemy will, more than likely, use social engineering to terrorize your organization. These hackers will 
rely on the fact that people within your organization are either willing to share private information or are 
unaware of the value of information they possess and therefore are careless about protecting it.”). 
26. Scott L. Schmookler & Christopher M. Kahler, Social Engineering: Is the Manipulation of 
Humans a Computer Fraud?, 22 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 7 (2016). 
27. CAROLE BASRI & MARY MACK, EDISCOVERY FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL § 30:10, § 30:11 
(2018) (“Criminals often send . . . phishing emails by the thousands, which is referred to as group 
phishing. A phishing email will generally claim that it is a well-known individual or organization (a 
bank, a credit card company), which the target may or may not have a relationship with, that needs 
certain access information, such as usernames, passwords, or anything else a criminal may need to gain 
access to the system they are targeting. If an individual opens a file in the email or clicks on a link, 
malware may be delivered to the system or the individual may be tricked into divulging system 
credentials or other important information Unlike group phishing, spear phishing, like its name 
suggests, is a targeted, individually designed, phishing attempt to gain access, or spread malware, to a 
specific individual or entity. The goal of a spear phishing attack is frequently to steal intellectual 
5
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1. Business Email Compromise 
Business Email Compromise (BEC) is a type of spear phishing 
attack where scammers target businesses that routinely send large 
sums of money via wire transfer.28 Between October 2013 and 
December 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported BEC 
losses nearing $1.6 billion.29 The scam proceeds when a company 
employee, usually in the accounting or finance department, is 
contacted by a third-party posing as a high-ranking company 
executive or trusted external vendor who requests a monetary wire 
transfer to a new or slightly-different-than-normal bank account.30 
The employee completes the transfer, and the company later 
discovers that the internal executive or external vendor never 
requested the transaction.31 All, or part, of the transferred funds are 
typically unrecoverable from the third-party scammer, and the 
company immediately looks to recover those losses.32 
 
 
 
 
 
property, financial data, trade or military secrets, and other confidential data.”). 
28. Lee Matthews, Phishing Scams Cost American Businesses Half a Billion Dollars a  Year, 
FORBES (May 5, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/05/05/phishing- 
scams-cost-american-businesses-half-a-billion-dollars-a-year/#7b7879703fa1 [https://perma.cc/T28S- 
9E56]. 
29. Id. 
30. Jan Larson & Raymond Simmons, Favoring Coverage for Business Email Compromise Losses, 
LAW 360 (Aug. 9, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1071615/favoring-coverage-for- 
business-email-compromise-losses [https://perma.cc/V7XK-K52K]. Accord Smedinghoff, supra note 6, 
at 2 (“A phishing attack typically involves sending individuals an email request for information that 
appears to come from a legitimate company, such as a bank, retailer, or other e-commerce Web site (the 
spoofed company). Through the use of a false ‘from’ address, copies of company logos, Web links, and 
graphics, these emails have the look and feel of a message that recipients might expect to receive from a 
company with whom they do business. Often the message makes reference to new security measures 
allegedly being undertaken by the spoofed company and asks recipients to verify or reconfirm 
confidential personal information, such as account numbers, Social Security numbers, passwords, and 
other sensitive information. To provide a sense of urgency, the message may indicate that the recipient’s 
account will be suspended or cancelled if the information is not verified by a certain date.”). 
31. Larson & Simmons, supra note 30. See also Thomas H. Bentz, Jr., Cyber Insurance and Social 
Engineering Fraud, Why Voluntary Transfers May Not be Covered by Your Insurance Policies, 21 
CYBERSPACE LAW., no. 2, Feb. 2016, at 1, 1, 
https://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Articles/0216_Bentz_CyberSpaceLawyer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JFS5-5GVA]. 
32. Larson & Simmons, supra note 30. 
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B. Coverage Options 
Apart from absorbing the loss, phished companies have limited 
avenues to recover the fraudulently transferred funds.33 They may 
look to the involved parties or even to the bank that facilitated the 
transfer. If this fails, a claim may be tendered under a relevant 
business insurance policy. 
 
1. Between Parties 
The involved parties may seek to recover the losses as between 
themselves. In Bile v. RREMC, LLC, a $63,000 employment 
discrimination settlement agreement was erroneously transmitted to a 
third party posing as the plaintiff’s counsel.34 Unable to retrieve the 
wire transfer, the payee refused to dismiss the employment 
discrimination action until the payor initiated a second $63,000 
payment.35 The payor refused as well, and both parties sought 
resolution in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia as per the settlement agreement’s venue stipulation.36 
Though the court ultimately held that no duplicate payment was due 
because the plaintiff’s counsel failed to warn the opposing parties of 
a known fraudulent email issue,37 the court interpreted common law 
contract principles and Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 
provisions to form the rule that “if a person has an obligation to 
deliver a check, and does not deliver that check due to that person’s 
own error, then that person remains liable on the underlying 
obligation.”38 Consequently, the risk of loss remains with the payor 
 
 
33. Larson & Simmons, supra note 30 (“The money from the transaction, of course, disappears and 
is often unrecoverable from the third party that fraudulently induced the transfer.”). 
34. Bile v. RREMC, LLC, No. 3:15CV051, 2016 WL 4487864, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2016). 
35. Id. at *2. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at *5, *11 (“Two days before the fraud was perpetrated on LeClairRyan, both Ubom and Bile 
were aware that an unidentified third party had targeted the settlement funds for diversion to a Barclay’s 
bank account that had nothing to do with Bile. Additionally, Bile and Ubom knew that 
ubomlawgroup@yahoo.com was being used in an effort to perpetrate the fraud. Ubom failed to pass this 
information along to Defendants, defense counsel, or the Court. This failure substantially contributed to 
the loss of $63,000.00 within the meaning of U.C.C. § 3-406.”). 
38. Id. at *10. 
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in the context of hacked settlement agreements. The payor is also 
unable to recover lost funds from the bank involved in a fraudulent 
transfer. 
 
2. Financial Institutions 
The Uniform Commercial Code generally allocates the risk of loss 
to banks that honored requests for fraudulent wire transfers.39 Yet, 
banks oftentimes are not bound to reinstate lost funds when the “bank 
and its customer agree to implement a security procedure designed to 
protect themselves against fraud.”40 The risk of loss will shift to the 
customer, that is, the party whose funds were fraudulently 
transferred, when “the security procedure is a commercially 
reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized 
payment orders, and the bank proves that it accepted the payment 
order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure.”41 
With yet another recovery mechanism closed, companies look  to 
their individual insurance policies for repayment of the lost funds. 
 
3. Cyber Insurance and Crime Insurance Policies 
One source of insurance coverage may be a cyber risk policy, 
though many U.S. businesses have not yet subscribed.42 For those 
that  have,  a  typical  cyber  insurance  policy  may  not  cover 
“losses . . . where companies have funds, data, or intellectual  
property stolen by computer hackers.”43 Instead, cyber policies tend 
 
39. Banco Del Austro, S.A. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 215 F. Supp. 3d 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
40. Choice Escrow & Land Title, LLC v. BancorpSouth Bank, 754 F.3d 611, 617 (8th Cir. 2014). 
41. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); see also Choice, 754 F.3d at 
617, 622–23 (noting that BancorpSouth Bank was not required to replenish $440,000 in lost funds 
because it maintained commercially reasonable “security procedures . . . [such as] password protection, 
daily  transfer  limits,  device  authentication,   and   dual   control”   and   “accepted   and   executed   
the . . . payment order in a way that comported with [the customer’s] reasonable expectations, as 
established by reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”). 
42. Why 27% of U.S. Firms Have No Plans to Buy Cyber Insurance, INS. J. (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/05/31/452647.htm [https://perma.cc/DE86- 
LJ5B] (detailing that, despite an expected increase of cyber breaches in the next year, 50-55% of U.S. 
firms do not have cyber risk insurance due in part to lack of clarity regarding cost and coverage). 
43. Joseph S. Harrington, Cyber Losses Testing Insurance Policy Boundaries, INS. J. (Apr. 13, 
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/04/13/447758.htm 
8
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to focus on “provid[ing] . . . [consulting] resources to mitigate cyber-
fraud [sic].”44 Without a cyber policy specifically covering losses 
from computer or funds transfer fraud, phished companies must 
tender a claim under a more traditional insurance policy.45 Though a 
crime insurance policy may seem like a logical source of coverage 
after a phishing attack, the prevailing case law demonstrates that 
courts differ on the interpretation of such provisions.46 
 
II. Analysis 
Federal circuit courts nationwide interpret crime insurance policies 
differently.47 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits align with traditional 
contract interpretation strategies or policy considerations to deny the 
insured’s claim for coverage.48 The Second and Sixth Circuits focus 
on the technical accomplishment of a phishing attack and apply that 
process to the policy language in question, and ultimately in favor of 
the insured.49 The Eleventh Circuit bases its rulings on the principles 
 
 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/38SM-BAK5]. 
44. Id.; see also Garrie & Mann, supra note 17. 
45. CyberRisk, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO. (2014), https://www.travelers.com/energy-practice/iw- 
documents/CyberRiskBond-59784.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y3Z-TWNB]; see also Harrington, supra note 
43. 
46. See Social Engineering Fraud, supra note 12. Though it varies depending on the insurer, a 
typical computer fraud provision of a crime insurance policy will pay the insured for the following: 
the [i]nsured’s direct loss of, or direct loss from damage to, [m]oney, [s]ecurities, and 
[o]ther [p]roperty directly caused by . . . [t]he use of any computer to fraudulently 
cause a transfer of [m]oney, [s]ecurities, or [o]ther [p]roperty from . . . inside the 
[p]remises . . . to a person . . . outside the [p]remises . . . or to a place outside the 
[p]remises. 
Posco Daewoo Am. Corp. v. Allnex USA, Inc., No. CV 17-483, 2017 WL 4922014, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 
31, 2017); see also BEAZLEY, Crime Insurance Policy 3, 
https://www.beazley.com/documents/Management%20Liability/Crime/Crime%20Policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LKD5-XXZE ] (“‘Computer Fraud’ means the Theft of Money, Securities or 
Merchandise by a Third Party, through the use of any Computer System.”); Social Engineering Fraud, 
supra note 12 (“Under [a crime policy], the insurer pays the insured for a direct loss of money sustained 
by the insured resulting from computer fraud committed by a third party.”). 
47. MacAneney, supra note 5. 
48. Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 259 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Taylor & 
Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV 14-3608 RSWL (SHx), 2015 WL 3824130, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 
18, 2015), aff’d, 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017). 
49. Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2018). 
9
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of direct causation, but even these decisions are inconsistent.50 A 
review of the federal circuit split is illustrative. 
 
A. Phishing Attacks Are Not Covered 
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits do not find coverage for phishing 
attacks under a computer fraud provision of a crime insurance 
policy.51 Both employ varying interpretative techniques to reach this 
result.52 The Ninth Circuit clings to traditional insurance policy 
guidelines, whereas the Fifth Circuit views insured responsibility as a 
principle policy consideration.53 Despite their diverse analysis, the 
insurer prevails in either circuit.54 
 
1. Canons of Construction 
In the Ninth Circuit, regardless of the claimed coverage provision, 
fraudulent wire transfers do not constitute a direct loss by the 
insured.55 In Taylor & Lieberman v. Federal Insurance Co., the 
plaintiff, an accounting firm, held power of attorney to make 
monetary wire transfers out of their client’s bank account.56 The 
client sent three seemingly legitimate emails to the plaintiff 
requesting over $320,000 in wire payments to bank accounts in 
 
50. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2018); 
Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2018); Success 
Healthcare v. Zurich Am. Ins., No. 9:14-81423-CIV, 2015 WL 11439019, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 
2015). 
51. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4. 
52. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 255; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *3. 
53. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4. 
54. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4. 
55. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *3. The court bullet pointed the three provisions 
under which plaintiff Taylor & Lieberman, an accounting firm, sought coverage: 
 Forgery Coverage: “The Company shall pay the Parent Corporation for direct 
loss sustained by an Insured resulting from Forgery or alteration of a Financial 
Instrument committed by a Third Party.” 
 Computer Fraud Coverage: “The Company shall pay the Parent Corporation 
for direct loss sustained by an Insured resulting from Computer Fraud 
committed by a Third Party.” 
 Funds Transfer Fraud Coverage: “The Company shall pay the Parent 
Corporation for direct loss sustained by an Insured resulting from Funds 
Transfer Fraud committed by a Third Party.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
56. Id. at *1. 
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Malaysia and Singapore.57 Following the discovery of the scam, the 
client’s bank recovered roughly only $93,000, leaving around 
$100,000 of the client’s funds lost to the BEC phishing scheme.58  
The client requested and received repayment of the lost funds, and 
Taylor & Lieberman sought indemnification of this loss under its 
crime insurance policy.59 
Both the district court and court of appeals employed various 
canons of construction to deny plaintiff’s claim of coverage.60 The 
district court relied on existing strategies of coverage interpretation 
and classified Taylor & Lieberman’s policy as an “indemnity polic[y] 
that [does] not provide third-party coverage . . . [so] [p]laintiff ha[d] 
not suffered a ‘direct loss.’” 61 Because the third-party liability 
sections were “expressly delineated” and “separated in an entirely 
different document,” plaintiff’s claimed coverage provisions, which 
made no mention of liability coverage, were construed as indemnity 
provisions that did not provide for third-party coverage under the 
canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.62 
Further, the court applied the whole-text canon to find that the 
policy as a whole “more likely contemplate[d] fraudulent violations 
against [p]laintiff that result[ed] in a ‘direct loss’ of [p]laintiff’s own 
money—not fraudulent violations upon which [p]laintiff relie[d] that 
result[ed] in a loss of a [third-party] client’s money.”63 This coverage 
 
57. Id. The fraudster took hold of the client’s email account for use in the first two email requests but 
used a different email address in the third request. Id. This final, different request tipped off plaintiff as 
to the fraud, and the third wire transfer was not completed. Id. 
58. Id. at *2. 
59. Id. at *2, *4. 
60. See generally Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017); Taylor & 
Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130. 
61. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *3 (“[M]ost courts . . . have indicated that liability 
policies may require an insurer to discharge an obligation of the insured to a third party for some act of 
the insured or its employee, while indemnity policies may not.”). 
62. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (noting the “canon that expressing one item of a 
commonly associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned”); Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 
WL 3824130, at *4; Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“A canon of construction . . . express[ing] or includ[ing] one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or 
of the alternative.”). 
63. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4. 
For example, the section of the [p]olicy in question also contains coverage for 
employee theft, which  is  similar  in  nature  to  the  ‘employee  fidelity’  policies  
that . . . [do not] require an insurer to discharge an obligation of the insured to a third 
11
Swanson: Phishing for Computer Fraud Insurance Coverage
Published by Reading Room, 2020
418 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 
 
 
denial left Taylor & Lieberman unreimbursed under the policy even 
though it had in good faith repaid the client for the lost funds.64 Such 
a result could not only damage the accounting firm’s reputation for 
monetary responsibility but also discourage said firm from 
distributing repayments to clients ahead of any claim tendered under 
its insurance policy. This too could damage the accounting firm’s 
relationship with clients; consequently, Taylor & Lieberman  
appealed in the hopes of a different outcome.65 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found no coverage for Taylor & 
Lieberman via different canons of construction.66 The plaintiff 
contended forgery coverage could apply to non-financial instruments, 
like emails, based on application of the rule of the last antecedent.67 
Under a “natural reading of the policy,” however, coverage logically 
extended also to forgery of “financial instruments, like checks, drafts, 
or the like,” but not to emails with wire instructions.68 Likewise, the 
fraudulent emails neither constituted an unauthorized “entry into” nor 
“introduction of instructions” to the plaintiff’s computer system.69 
Instead, the ordinary-meaning canon was applied to find that such 
computer fraud language is generally understood to cover only 
hacking-type attacks, “like the introduction of malicious computer 
code” to a computer system, as opposed to just “the text of three 
emails.”70 Whereas the Ninth Circuit favors canons of construction to 
interpret crime insurance coverage, the Firth Circuit looks to policy 
considerations in its decisions. 
 
party for some act of the insured or its employee. 
Id. at *3–4; Whole-Text Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine that a legal 
text . . . must be construed as a whole.”). 
64. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4. 
65. Taylor & Lieberman, 681 F. App’x at 628. 
66. Id. at 628–29. 
67. Id. (“The policy provides coverage for an insured’s direct loss ‘resulting from [f]orgery or 
alteration of a [f]inancial [i]nstrument by a [t]hird [p]arty.”); Rule of the Last Antecedent, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An interpretive principle by which a court determines that qualifying 
words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases 
more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing.”). 
68. Taylor & Lieberman, 681 F. App’x at 628. 
69. Id. at 629. 
70. Id.; Ordinary-Meaning Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine that 
words in a legal instrument are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings unless the context 
indicates that they bear a technical sense or are otherwise defined in the text.”). 
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2. Policy Considerations 
The Fifth Circuit interprets computer fraud coverage provisions 
narrowly.71 In Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., a 
petroleum company’s employee received a telephone call from a 
purported vendor requesting a change to the bank account details for 
invoice payment.72 After the vendor’s follow-up email with attached 
instructions on letterhead, as well as the petroleum company’s 
internal approval of the change and verification call to the vendor, 
millions of dollars were transferred into the new bank account before 
the petroleum company discovered this was a fraudulent request.73 In 
considering Apache’s claim for coverage under the computer fraud 
provision,74 the court viewed Apache’s change-request protocols as 
“flawed” and stated that the company could have avoided the fraud 
but for a “fail[ure] to investigate accurately the new, but fraudulent, 
information provided to it.”75 In this vein, the court declined to find 
coverage where the insured’s due diligence investigation could have 
uncovered the fraud.76 To find otherwise would be too far-reaching in 
“convert[ing] the computer fraud provision to one for general fraud” 
since “few—if any—fraudulent schemes would not involve some 
form of computer-facilitated communication,” like emails.77 Despite 
 
71. See generally Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016). 
72. Id. at 253. 
73. Id. at 253–54 (“Apache[, the petroleum company,] received notification [that the vendor] had not 
received the £4.3 million (approximately $7 million) Apache had transferred to the new (fraudulent) 
account. After an investigation determined the criminals were likely based in Latvia, Apache recouped a 
substantial portion of the funds. It contends, however, it suffered a loss, before the $1 million policy 
deductible, of approximately £1.5 million (approximately $2.4 million).”). 
74. Id. at 254 (“[Great American Insurance Company] will pay for loss of, and loss from damage to, 
money, securities and other property resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently 
cause a transfer of that property from inside the premises or banking premises . . . to a person (other than 
a messenger) outside those premises . . . [or] to a place outside those premises.”). 
75. Id. at 258–59 (“Arguably, Apache invited the computer-use at issue . . . [since] [t]he email was 
sent only after Apache’s advising, in reply to the criminals’ change-request telephone call, that the 
request had to be made on Petrofac letterhead. The criminals complied: by attaching to the email (sent 
using a slightly different domain name) a letter on altered letterhead; and, as stated in the email, by 
allegedly mailing that letter to Apache. Accordingly, the computer-use was in response to Apache’s 
refusing, during the telephone call, to, for example, transcribe the change-request, which it could have 
then investigated with its records.”). 
76. Id. at 269. 
77. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 258; see also Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of 
Am., 656 F. App’x 332, 333 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[N]o coverage was afforded under the [c]omputer [f]raud 
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these policy considerations that are construed against the insured, the 
Second and Sixth Circuits find coverage in favor of the insured on 
different grounds.78 
 
B. Phishing Attacks Are Covered 
The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts break from their sister 
circuits in finding coverage for the policy holder.79 In the Second 
Circuit, traditional interpretive tools are disfavored over a modern 
examination of the steps to accomplish a phishing attack.80 Similarly, 
the Sixth Circuit forgoes a conventional understanding of insurance 
contract causation in favor of an expansive interpretation.81 Both 
views, however, capture the insured’s conduct and find coverage 
under the computer fraud policy.82 
 
1. Technical Interpretations 
The Second Circuit reads a computer fraud provision quite literally 
to find coverage for the insured.83 Medidata Solutions, Inc. v. Federal 
Insurance Co. involved a familiar phishing scheme whereby a 
Medidata accounts payable employee was contacted by the company 
president with instructions to wire $4.7 million to an external 
attorney who was handling a confidential business acquisition.84 
After completing this transfer, a second, suspicious wire request 
 
provision for any transfers to [its payroll provider] that were authorized by Pestmaster . . . [since the 
policy] require[s] an unauthorized transfer of funds. When [the payroll provider] transferred funds 
pursuant to authorization from Pestmaster, the transfer was not fraudulently caused. Because computers 
are used in almost every business transaction, reading this provision to cover all transfers that involve 
both a computer and fraud at some point in the transaction would convert this [c]rime [p]olicy into a 
‘[g]eneral [f]raud’ [p]olicy. While [the insurer] could have drafted this language more narrowly, we 
believe protection against all fraud is not what was intended by this provision, and not what Pestmaster 
could reasonably have expected this provision to cover.”). 
78. See generally Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 
2018); Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 F. App’x 
117 (2d Cir. 2018). 
79. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 465; Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 479. 
80. Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 477. 
81. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 463. 
82. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 465; Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 479. 
83. Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 477. 
84. Id. at 473. 
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came through, and Medidata discovered the fraud scheme.85  
Medidata sought coverage under the computer fraud provision of 
their crime coverage policy.86 The district court, and the Second 
Circuit on appeal, found that Medidata’s losses were covered under 
the policy since the “fraudsters . . . crafted a computer-based attack 
that manipulated [its] email system,” and this constituted an “‘entry 
of data into’ [and] ‘change to data elements or program logic of’ a 
computer system.”87 Moreover, Medidata also suffered a direct loss 
within the meaning of the policy since “the [phishing] attack was the 
proximate cause of [the] losses” and the employees’ involvement was 
not “sufficient to sever the causal relationship between the [phishing] 
attack and the losses incurred.”88 
Instead of citing to external policy or maxims of interpretation, the 
court focused on the actual, technical method of intrusion to find 
coverage.89 The fraudster manipulated the “true origin of the spoofed 
emails” by “embedd[ing] a computer code” that caused the electronic 
computer system components to display different email address 
senders in the “From” field.90 Upon receipt, Medidata’s email system 
 
85. Id. at 473–74. 
86. Id. at 474. The policy’s crime coverage section protected an organization from a direct loss of 
money resulting from a computer fraud committed by a third party. Id. Computer fraud included the 
“unlawful taking or the fraudulently induced transfer of money” as a result of a computer violation. Id. 
The policy defined a computer violation as both a fraudulent entry of data into a computer system and a 
“change to data elements or program logic of a computer system.” Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 474. 
87. Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We agree with the 
district court that the plain and unambiguous language of the policy covers the losses incurred by 
Medidata here. While Medidata concedes that no hacking occurred, the fraudsters nonetheless crafted a 
computer-based attack that manipulated Medidata’s email system, which the parties do not dispute 
constitutes a ‘computer system’ within the meaning of the policy. The spoofing code enabled the 
fraudsters to send messages that inaccurately appeared, in all respects, to come from a high-ranking 
member of Medidata’s organization. Thus the attack represented a fraudulent entry of data into the 
computer system, as the spoofing code was introduced into the email system. The attack also made a 
change to a data element, as the email system’s appearance was altered by the spoofing code to 
misleadingly indicate the sender. Accordingly, Medidata’s losses were covered by the terms of the 
computer fraud provision.”). 
88.  Id. at 119. 
89. Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 477. 
90. Id. (“[T]he thief constructed messages in Internet Message Format (‘IMF’) which the parties 
compare to a physical letter containing a return address. The IMF message was transmitted to Gmail in 
an electronic envelope called a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (‘SMTP’). Much like a physical 
envelope, the SMTP Envelope contained a recipient and a return address. To mask the true origin of the 
spoofed emails, the thief embedded a computer code. The computer code caused the SMTP Envelope 
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interpreted the spoofed message as from the company president 
rather than the hacker.91 In this way, the court saw the fraudulent 
scheme as a change to a data element, since the email system 
displayed the incorrect sender because of the computer code, and as 
an entry of data element in a computer system because the malicious 
computer code was embedded therein.92 According to the Second 
Circuit, both phases of the phishing scheme fit squarely within the 
policy’s provisions of coverage for the insured.93 The Sixth Circuit 
similarly comes down in favor of the insured.94 
 
2. Principles of Causation 
The Sixth Circuit employs a causation analysis when interpreting 
computer fraud coverage.95 In American Tooling Center, Inc. v. 
Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America, a tool and die 
manufacturer that outsourced some of its orders to a Chinese 
company mistakenly sent an imposter approximately $834,000 in 
vendor payments via wire transfer.96 American Tooling claimed the 
losses under its computer fraud policy, but Travelers (their insurance 
agency) denied the claim.97 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
and the IMF Letter to display different email addresses in the ‘From’ field. The spoofed emails showed 
the thief’s true email address in the SMTP ‘From’ field, and Medidata’s president’s email address in the 
IMF ‘From’ field. When Gmail received the spoof emails, the system compared the address in the IMF 
‘From’ field with a list of contacts and populated Medidata’s president’s name and picture. The 
recipients of the Gmail messages only saw the information in the IMF ‘From’ field.”) (citations 
omitted). 
91. Id. 
92. Medidata, 729 F. App’x at 118. 
93. Id. 
94. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2018). 
95. Id. at 460. 
96. Id. at 457–58. (“Gizinski[, American Tooling’s President and Treasurer,] emailed YiFeng 
employee Jessie Chen requesting that Chen provide ATC all outstanding invoices. An unidentified third 
party, through means unknown, intercepted this email. This third party, impersonating Chen, then began 
a correspondence with Gizinski about the outstanding invoices. On March 27, 2015, the impersonator 
emailed Gizinski and claimed that, due to an audit, ATC should wire its payments to a different account 
from usual. YiFeng had previously (and legitimately) informed ATC it had changed its banking details, 
and ATC had no process for verifying the changed information. Consequently, Gizinski wired the 
money to the new account.”) (citations omitted). 
97. Id. at 458–59 (“The [p]olicy states . . . [that] [t]he [c]ompany will pay the [i]nsured for the 
[i]nsured’s direct loss of, or direct loss from damage to . . . [m]oney . . . directly caused by [c]omputer 
[f]raud.”). 
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reversed the lower court and found coverage for American Tooling 
based on principles of causation.98 The court focused on the timing of 
the loss, and found “no intervening event” occurred between the 
transfer to the fraudster and the point at which the funds were lost.99 
Thus, American Tooling suffered a “direct loss” as caused by the 
fraudster.100 
Equally, the scheme constituted a “computer fraud” within the 
meaning of the policy.101 The policy only required that a computer be 
used on the one hand, and a fraudulent money transfer be caused on 
the other.102 Contrary to Travelers’ suggestion, a computer fraud was 
not limited only to scenarios where the phishing scheme fraudulently 
caused a computer to make the transfer, such as in a more traditional 
hack where “a nefarious party somehow gains access to and/or 
controls the insured’s computer.”103 Travelers had not expressly 
limited computer fraud coverage to such hacking situations in their 
terms of coverage, so the court was not going to read such a 
 
 
 
 
98. Id. at 462–63, 465; see 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.7, Westlaw (database updated 2018) 
(“One of the rules most commonly laid down is that damages are not recoverable for injury that is too 
remote from the conduct of the defendant constituting his breach of duty. Another form of the rule is  
that damages are not recoverable for losses suffered or gains prevented unless the requirements of the 
law as to “proximate” causation are satisfied. The form of this rule is the same whether it is being 
applied in the field of contracts or in the field of torts, and in both alike, its meaning and its application 
are equally indefinite and uncertain.”). 
99. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 460. 
100. Id. at 459–61. Notably, the court found unpersuasive the suggestion that the loss was only 
incurred later in time when the fraud was discovered, not at the moment of payment to the imposter, 
because American Tooling “had already contracted with YiFeng to pay that amount of money for the 
product it had received ” Id. “This interpretation defies common sense” when viewed against a 
“simplified analogy:” 
Imagine Alex owes Blair five dollars. Alex reaches into her purse and pulls out a five-
dollar bill. As she is about to hand Blair the money, Casey runs by and snatches the 
bill from Alex’s fingers. Travelers’ theory would have us say that Casey caused no 
direct loss to Alex because Alex owed that money to Blair and was preparing to hand 
him the five-dollar bill. 
Id. 
101. Id. at 461 (“The [p]olicy specifically defines the term . . . [c]omputer [f]raud [to mean] [t]he use 
of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of [m]oney . . . from inside the . . . [f]inancial 
[i]nstitution [p]remises . . . to a person . . . outside the [f]inancial [i]nstitution [p]remises . . . [or] to a 
place outside the . . . [f]inancial [i]nstitution [p]remises.”). 
102. Id. 
103. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 461–62. 
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restriction into the policy; thus, the door was left open concerning 
coverage of BECs.104 
It is not enough, however, for there to be a direct loss and a 
computer fraud. The company must also demonstrate, as per the 
policy language, that “its ‘direct loss’ was ‘directly caused by’ the 
computer fraud.”105 The Sixth Circuit, borrowing a test from the 
Eleventh Circuit, deemed the computer fraud to have directly caused 
the direct loss when the loss was incurred immediately after wiring 
the funds to the impersonator pursuant to the fraudulent email.106 
Interestingly, the company’s “internal actions” were not found to 
break the causal chain between the fraudulent emails and the loss, 
suggesting that, in the Sixth Circuit at least, external steps taken by 
the company between the fraudulent act and the loss incurred could 
produce contrary results.107 
 
C. The Eleventh Circuit’s View 
The Eleventh Circuit has also opined on the issue with mixed 
results. On the one hand, it employs the same causation test as the 
Sixth Circuit, but comes to a different result that favors the insurer.108 
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit also adopts a cause-in-fact 
 
104. Id. at 462 (“If Travelers had wished to limit the definition of computer fraud to such criminal 
behavior it could have done so. Cf. Citizens Ins. v. Pro-Seal Serv. Grp., 730 N.W.2d 682, 686 (2007) 
(holding that a contract is construed in favor of the insured if there is an ambiguity). Because Travelers 
did not do so, the third party’s fraudulent scheme in this case constitutes ‘Computer Fraud’ per the 
Policy’s definition.”). 
105. Id. at 462. 
106. Id. at 463 (“[American Tooling] received the fraudulent email at step one. [Its] employees then 
conducted a series of internal actions, all induced by the fraudulent email, which led to the transfer of 
the money to the impersonator at step two. This was ‘the point of no return,’ because the loss occurred 
once [American Tooling] transferred the money in response to the fraudulent emails. Thus, the computer 
fraud ‘directly caused’ [American Tooling’s] ‘direct loss.’”). 
107. Id. at 462 (“The chain of events that was precipitated by the fraudulent emails and led to the wire 
transfers involved multiple internal actions at [American Tooling]. After receiving each fraudulent 
email, [American Tooling] verified that YiFeng had completed the tasks required for the next scheduled 
payment. Gizinski subsequently determined which outstanding invoices to pay, and chose to pay the 
YiFeng invoice. He then signed into the banking portal and manually entered the fraudulent banking 
information emailed by the impersonator. Finally, after Gizinski submitted the wire transfer, [American 
Tooling’s] Assistant Comptroller approved the payment. [American Tooling] thus suffered its loss 
immediately after the transfer, which marked the end of the ‘Computer Fraud’ as defined in the policy.”) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
108. Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 936 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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approach that aligns with the insured’s claim for coverage.109 This 
intra-circuit split further highlights the divide amongst the courts. 
 
1. The Point of No Return Test 
As in the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit decides phishing 
attack coverage disputes based on principles of causation in light of 
the link between the fraud and the loss.110 This link proved  too 
remote in Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Great 
American Insurance Co. where a chit retailer was defrauded out of 
$11.4 million after thieves found a way to redeem a single chit 
multiple times.111 The insured, Interactive Communications, held a 
standard computer fraud policy with Great American Insurance,112 
but the court adopted a plain meaning of the word “directly”113 to  
find that the loss came only after the “fraudsters . . . set into motion 
[a] chain of events.”114 Unfortunately for Interactive 
Communications, the fraudsters’ chit manipulation occurred  at “Step 
 
109. Id. at 933–36; But-For Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without 
which the event could not have occurred.”). 
110. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 935–36; Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15- 
CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at *4, *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016). 
111. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 930–32; see also Joshua Davey & Kevin Denny, Federal Court: 
Computer Fraud Provision Does Not Cover Fraudulent Debit Card Transactions Conducted Over the 
Telephone, MCGUIREWOODS INS. RECOVERY BLOG (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.insurancerecoveryblog.com/2017/04/federal-court-computer-fraud-provision-does-not- 
cover-fraudulent-debit-card-transactions-conducted-over-the-telephone/ [https://perma.cc/LF5Q-BYQ7] 
(“The insured, InComm Holdings, processes debit cards that allow consumers to purchase credits, called 
‘chits,’ from retailers, which can then be redeemed for actual dollars that are loaded onto prepaid debit 
cards to make everyday purchases. InComm’s redemption program works as follows: Third-party banks 
issue prepaid debit cards to consumers. Consumers buy ‘chits’ from retailers like CVS or Walgreens for 
the value of the chit plus a service fee. Each chit represents the amount purchased, i.e., a $100 chit 
represents $100. The retailer then wires the consumer’s funds to InComm. To convert chits to actual 
dollars on the debit cards, a consumer calls InComm and uses voice or touchtone commands to ‘redeem’ 
the chits. After a chit is redeemed, InComm wires the amount of the chit to the bank that issued the debit 
card, and the funds become available for the consumer’s use.”). 
112. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 931 (“[T]he policy provides coverage for ‘loss of, and loss from 
damage to, money, securities and other property resulting directly from the use of any computer to 
fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the premises or banking premises: (a) to a 
person (other than a messenger) outside those premises; or (b) to a place outside those premises.’”) 
(emphasis added). 
113. Id. at 934 (“In accordance with the term’s ordinary meaning, we hold that . . . one thing results 
‘directly’ from another if it follows straightaway, immediately, and without any intervention or 
interruption.”). 
114. Id. 
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1,” but the funds were not lost until “Step 4,” and, as such, the “use 
of . . . computers did not . . . immediately . . . cause [the] loss.”115 
The Eleventh Circuit formulated a “point of no return” test 
whereby, for computer fraud policy purposes, a loss occurs at the 
point in time when the insured loses control over the funds.116 If this 
dominion is lost immediately following that fraudulent act, such as 
the use of a computer, the loss will “result [ ] directly” from the 
fraudulent activity.117 Otherwise, where there are intervening “steps, 
acts, [or] actors,” the loss is too remote from the fraud to be covered 
under a standard computer fraud policy.118 Accordingly, the court 
uses a strict causation standard where virtually any intervening steps 
between the fraud and the loss, irrespective of their impetus or who 
performs the step, will break the causal chain such that the insured 
may not recover under the policy.119 Another decision within this 
circuit, however, relaxes this causation standard.120 
 
2. But for Causation Test 
The Eleventh Circuit has also interpreted a computer fraud policy 
using a “‘but for’ test.”121 Success Healthcare, LLC v. Zurich 
American Insurance Co. involved a payroll director who obtained 
Success’s electronic signature to fraudulently wire more than $10 
million away from the company.122 Zurich American  denied 
coverage under the policy123 citing, in pertinent part, that the “theft 
was not ‘directly related to’ the use of a computer.”124 Success sued 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 935 (“InComm retained at least some control over the funds . . . even after [Step 2] . . . and 
could prevent their loss by intervening to halt the disbursement of money ........ ”). 
117. Id. 
118. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 935. 
119. Id. 
120. See generally Success Healthcare v. Zurich Am. Ins., No. 9:14 81423-CIV, 2015 WL 11439019 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2015 WL 11438207 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2015). 
121. Id. at *6. 
122. Id. at *1. 
123. Id. at  *5  (“[T]he  [p]olicy provides coverage for ....... ’[c]omputer [f]raud,’ which is defined in 
relevant part to be ‘theft of property following and directly related to the use of any computer to 
fraudulently cause  a transfer of that property from inside ....... the ‘premises’ or ‘banking premises’ to a 
person ...... outside those ‘premises’ or to a place outside those ‘premises.’”) (citation omitted). 
124. Id. at *6. 
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for breach of contract, and the court resolved this issue by invoking a 
rudimentary but for test for causation—but for the payroll director’s 
use of a computer, the fraud would not have occurred.125 This 
formulation was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,126 but it 
unfortunately brought no interpretive uniformity to the computer 
fraud coverage arena. The following proposal suggests a remedy in 
this regard. 
 
III. Proposal 
A common theme among the prevailing case law is the insurer’s 
initial denial of coverage under the computer fraud provision of the 
crime insurance policy.127 This clash is seemingly ingrained into the 
professional relationship as insurance companies seek to keep down 
their bottom line by limiting claim payments and, in contrast, the 
insured looks to avoid the risk that the insured believes the policy 
was meant to protect against in the first place.128 An ideal proposal to 
bridge this coverage gap is for insurers, in recognition of BEC 
prevalence, to uniformly spell out the types of coverages that are and 
are not envisioned by the policy.129 This ensures that both parties 
have a meeting of the minds regarding the contractual coverages of 
the policy. This solution may avoid coverage disputes for future 
policy holders, but it does not address the inevitable disagreements 
between current policy holders and the coverages available under 
 
 
125. Id. 
126. Success Healthcare, 2015 WL 11439019, at *7. 
127. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2018); 
Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2018); Interactive Commc’ns Int’l 
v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 932 (11th Cir. 2018); Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. 
App’x 627, 627 (9th Cir. 2017); Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 254 (5th Cir. 
2016); Success, 2015 WL 11439019, at *1. 
128. Duncan Minty, Ethics and Insurance Claims—Part 3—Addressing Conflicts of Interest, ETHICS 
AND INS. (June 18, 2013), https://ethicsandinsurance.info/2013/06/18/ethics-claims-3-conflicts-of- 
interest/ [https://perma.cc/CD5F-JH8G]; What to Do if Your Business Insurance Claim is Denied, 
FINDLAW, https://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/liability-and-insurance/what-to-do-if-your-business- 
insurance-claim-is-denied.html [https://perma.cc/TA36-EXFW] (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). 
129. Bill Wilson, Resolving Insurance Coverage and Claim Disputes, PROPERTYCASUALTY360 (Aug. 
14, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2018/08/14/resolving-insurance-coverage- 
and-claim-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/Z8PQ-5EQR] (“[T]he best way to [avoid a] dispute [is] to have 
addressed the issue at policy inception.”). 
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existing, standard computer fraud provision language. This resolution 
will be dependent on uniformity in judicial interpretation so that 
insureds can predict coverage gaps and acquire additional protection 
as required. Similarly, insurers can update their policy language and 
offerings in line with this uniform interpretation so that fewer claims 
and coverage disputes arise. While the facts of each claim vary, 
insurance disputes over phishing attacks are best adjudicated using a 
hybrid scheme that incorporates the Fifth Circuit’s theory of 
accountability with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit’s temporal 
causation analysis. 
 
A. Accountability 
Accountability as a judicial consideration can influence the insurer 
and insured alike. For the policy holder, the knowledge that the 
measures taken to detect and mitigate a phishing attack will be 
considered in a coverage dispute may induce the insured to increase 
security measures ahead of any potential attack. Indeed, cyber 
security experts call for this type of preparedness irrespective of any 
insurance   policy   language.130     Partnering   sound   cyber   security 
 
130. Joanna Belbey, How to Avoid Cyber Attacks: 5 Best Practices From SEC and FINRA, FORBES 
(June 30, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joannabelbey/2017/06/30/how-to-avoid- 
cyberattacks-5-best-practices-from-sec-and-finra/#3bbb09021a16 [https://perma.cc/KD2T-RC9S] 
(noting that governance, risk assessment, cybersecurity training, access management, and vendor 
management are among the best ways to educate about and defend against cyber risks); Business Email 
Compromise: The 3.1 Billion Dollar Scam, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160614.aspx [https://perma.cc/922X-5DJE] (“Businesses with an 
increased awareness and understanding of the BEC scam are more likely to recognize when they have 
been targeted by BEC fraudsters, and are therefore more likely to avoid falling victim and sending 
fraudulent payments. Businesses that deploy robust internal prevention techniques at all levels 
(especially targeting front line employees who may be the recipients of initial phishing attempts), have 
proven highly successful in recognizing and deflecting BEC attempts. Some financial institutions 
reported holding their customer requests for international wire transfers for an additional period of time, 
to verify the legitimacy of the request         Avoid free web-based e-mail accounts: Establish a company 
domain name and use it to establish company e-mail accounts in lieu of free, web-based accounts. Be 
careful what is posted to social media and company websites, especially job duties/descriptions, 
hierarchal information, and out of office details. Be suspicious of requests for secrecy or pressure to take 
action quickly. Consider additional IT and financial security procedures, including the implementation 
of a 2-step verification process . . . . Significant Changes: Beware of sudden changes in business 
practices. For example, if a current business contact suddenly asks to be contacted via their personal e-
mail address when all previous official correspondence has been through company e-mail, the request 
could be fraudulent. Always verify via other channels that you are still communicating with your 
legitimate  business  partner . . . . Verify  changes  in  vendor  payment  location  by  adding  additional 
22
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prevention with judicial notice of those procedures can result  in 
fewer successful phishing attacks against the insured and, if a 
coverage dispute does arise, can ensure that the policy holder is not 
abusing the computer fraud protection by seeking “shelter” as a 
“provision . . . for general fraud.”131 Similarly, insurance companies 
would see benefits when courts favor responsible cyber security 
protocols. 
Risk management is central to the insurance industry.132 Insurers 
measure various factors in determining the premium to charge a 
policy holder or whether to offer any coverage at all.133 In the cyber 
policy arena, insurers typically require that potential  insureds 
produce a security assessment of their cyber defenses.134 With the 
relevant factors in mind, insurers determine individual or business 
premiums based on “how much cost will be involved in paying 
 
 
two-factor authentication such as having a secondary sign-off by company personnel. Confirm requests 
for transfers of funds. When using phone verification as part of the two-factor authentication, use 
previously known numbers, not the numbers provided in the e-mail request. Know the habits of your 
customers, including the details of, reasons behind, and amount of payments. Carefully scrutinize all e-
mail requests for transfers of funds to determine if the requests are out of the ordinary.”); Security  101: 
Business Email Compromise (BEC) Schemes, TREND MICRO (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/business-email- 
compromise-bec-schemes [https://perma.cc/X9Y4-BEKS] (“Businesses are advised to stay vigilant and 
educate employees on how to prevent being victimized by [BEC] scams and . . . here are some tips on 
how to stay protected and secure: Carefully scrutinize all emails. Be wary of irregular emails that are 
sent from C-suite executives, as they are used to trick employees into acting with urgency. Review 
emails that request transfer of funds to determine if the requests are irregular[; e]ducate and train 
employees. While employees are a company’s biggest asset, they’re also usually its weakest link when it 
comes to security. Commit to training employees according to the company’s best practices. Remind 
them that adhering to company policies is one thing,  but  developing  good  security  habits  is  
another[; v]erify any changes in vendor payment location by using a secondary sign-off by company 
personnel[; s]tay updated on your customers’ habits including the details, and reasons  behind 
payments[; c]onfirm requests for transfer of funds when using phone verification as part of two-factor 
authentication, use known familiar numbers, not the details provided in the email requests.”). 
131. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 258–59. 
132. Paul Kaye, Risk Measurement in Insurance, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y (2005), 
https://www.casact.org/pubs/dpp/dpp05/05dpp1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2UP-ATWS]. 
133. Michelle Boardman, Risk Data in Insurance Interpretation, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 157, 162–63 
(2009); Mila Araujo, What Is an Insurance Premium (and How Does It Work)?, BALANCE (July 9, 
2018), https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-what-is-an-insurance-premium-4155239 
[https://perma.cc/Z3R4-L3DS]. The type and amount of coverage sought determines the premium. Id. 
Likewise, personal information “from credit rating to car accident frequency or personal claims history 
and even occupation” play a role in premium pricing. Id. 
134. Mark Lanterman, Managing Cyber Risk: Is Cyber Liability Insurance Important for Law Firms?, 
75 BENCH & B. MINN. 13, 14 (2018). 
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claims as well as how much money the insurance company should 
collect in order to make sure that they make enough money to pay 
potential claims.”135 Judicial emphasis on cyber accountability would 
then incentivize “cultures of security,” resulting in less claims under 
the policy.136 Over time, fewer BEC claims would lessen the risk and 
cost to insure, resulting in a net benefit to all stakeholders.137 This 
principle, coupled with a court’s temporal causation standard, would 
yield the best outcome in computer fraud coverage disputes. 
 
B. Temporal Causation 
Unsurprisingly, when coverage disputes arise, the insured  will 
seek an expansive definition of “direct loss,” where a sequence of 
events does not break the chain of causation between the claimed loss 
and the computer fraud, and the insured will insist upon an unbroken 
link between the loss and fraud.138 While the Sixth and Eleventh 
Circuits apply the latter interpretation to computer fraud 
provisions,139 a majority of jurisdictions see “direct [as] direct” in 
similar policy language that provides coverage against employee 
theft.140 Regardless of the type of covered loss, insurance policies 
routinely include language such as “direct loss” or “loss resulting 
 
135. Araujo, supra note 133. 
136. Lanterman, supra note 134. 
137. Chubb Launches Online Cyber Risk Index, INS. J. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/04/12/486335.htm [https://perma.cc/NY5E- 
JATP]. Global insurance provider Chubb subscribes to this culture of cyber threat prevention by 
“offer[ing] businesses throughout North America [an online index that] provide[s] insight into real 
threats facing them on a daily basis.” Id. Chubb understands that “[t]he first step to protecting a business 
from a cyber attack is staying aware of what threats are most prominent to a company’s size and 
industry [and] . . . help[ing] users to better understand their exposures and manage risk before a cyber 
incident occurs.” Id. 
138. Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at 
*5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016) (“It is reasonable for [the insured] to interpret the language of the policy to 
provide coverage even if there were intervening events between the fraud and the loss. [The insurer’s] 
interpretation, which would require an immediate link between the injury and its cause, is also 
reasonable.”). 
139. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2018); 
Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 934 (11th Cir. 2018). 
140. Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 665, 674 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“Other jurisdictions have considered the meaning of the word in the context of similar insurance 
policies. The weight of the authorities define ‘directly’ as meaning ‘immediate’—known by some as the 
‘direct is direct’ approach—although other jurisdictions espouse a ‘proximate cause’ approach.”). 
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directly from,” and state and federal circuit courts around the country 
have predominantly adopted a direct, immediate understanding of 
causation when adjudicating coverage disputes.141 For purposes of 
promoting uniformity and predictability, courts should apply the 
direct causation approach when deciding computer fraud coverage 
cases. There are, however, additional considerations that make this 
the best approach. 
 
1. Intent of the Parties 
Limiting covered losses to those that immediately follow the fraud 
not only comports with the plain meaning of the term,142 but this 
approach also aligns with the intent of the parties at the time of 
contract formation.143 None of the policies in question expressly 
define the sorts of losses covered when a direct loss of money is 
caused by a computer fraud. Hence, where the “terms of the [policy] 
itself” do not clearly indicate the parties’ understanding, courts can 
look to a “body of law or an established custom or usage” to provide 
a definition.144 Because a majority of courts, both federal and state, 
subscribe to the immediate causation standard,145 the parties’ intent 
may be inferred as aligning with this common understanding.146 
 
141. David Spielbauer & Shane Mecham, Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc: A Fifty-State Survey of 
Causation in Fidelity Bonds, 22 FIDELITY L.J. 265, 266 (2016) (“Unfortunately, not all courts agree on 
what the phrase ‘loss resulting directly from’ means. The majority rule and modern trend is for courts to 
enforce the plain language of the contract and conclude that the [policy] unambiguously requires the  
loss to be ‘direct’ or immediate. Intervening and superseding acts break the causal chain. A minority of 
courts . . . interpret the [policy’s] ‘direct loss’ language to mean ‘proximate cause’ or ‘but for’ 
causation.”); Id. at 281 (noting that thirty-three of fifty states and eight of eleven federal circuits follow 
the direct causation approach). 
142. Direct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Free from extraneous influence; 
immediate.”). 
143. Beazley Ins. Co. Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 880 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A]n insurance 
contract is interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the clear language of the 
contract.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
144. Id. (“In assessing whether there is [ ] a prevailing federal definition, we consider not whether 
there is complete unanimity among the courts that have addressed the question, but rather whether there 
is an overwhelming current of judicial opinion, that is, a meaning used by the vast majority of federal 
courts.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
145. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
146. Beazley, 880 F.3d at 70 (“Federal case law is simply another way of determining whether the 
parties shared a common language that would lead them to a mutual, unambiguous understanding of the 
meaning of an undefined term.”). 
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Certainly, parties could draft policy language more clearly, but  
absent these specific provisions, the “ordinary and popular sense” is 
deemed to be its intended definition.147 
 
2. Reasonable Expectations 
The temporal causation analysis is also superior because of the 
parties’ reasonable coverage expectations. Computer fraud policies 
typically cover traditional hacking where a person “surreptitiously 
break[s] into the computer, network, servers, or database of another 
person or organization.”148 Though insureds “have tried to extend 
hacking coverage to instances in which criminals give bad 
information that is then legally entered into the policy holder’s 
computer,” policy coverage is generally understood to apply where a 
third party carries out the computer fraud.149 Indeed, many insurance 
companies offer a social engineering fraud coverage extension or 
endorsement that specifically applies to BEC schemes where an 
authorized company employee ultimately executes the wire transfer 
based on fraudulent instructions.150 Based on the contract 
 
147. Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We interpret 
words in accordance with their ordinary and popular sense, unless the words are used in a technical 
sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage.”) (quoting Emp’rs Reinsurance Co. v. Superior 
Court, 161 Cal. App. 4th 906, 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)). 
148. Hack, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Alan Rutkin, Cyber-Crimes: How Have 
Courts Dealt with the Insurance Implications of This Emerging Risk?, AM. C. COVERAGE & 
EXTRACONTRACTUAL COUNS. (2016), 
https://coverage.memberclicks.net/assets/Documents/accec_2016_annualmeeting_attendeematerials_we 
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7H7-DLCA]. 
149. Rutkin, supra note 148. 
150. Lynda Bennett, Beware of Coverage Gaps for Social Engineering Losses, RISK MGMT. 
MONITOR (May 23, 2016), https://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/beware-of-coverage-gaps/ 
[https://perma.cc/DH9H-3SM2] (“Given the prevalence of social engineering claims and the clear 
market for companies looking to insure against such risks, some insurers have begun to offer an 
endorsement that provides coverage for social engineering claims.”); Social Engineering Fraud 
Coverage for Crime Insurance, CHUBB, https://www.chubb.com/ca-en/business-insurance/social- 
engineering-fraud-coverage-for-crime-insurance.aspx [https://perma.cc/SJW2-4QHE] (last visited Sept. 
17, 2019) (“The Social Engineering Fraud Endorsement insures a range of social engineering fraud 
losses when added  to  a  Chubb  Crime  Insurance  policy,  including . . . [v]endor  or  supplier  
imitation . . . [e]xecutive imitation . . . [and] [c]lient imitation.”); Social Engineering Fraud 
Endorsement, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO. (2016), https://www.travelers.com/iw- 
documents/professional-liability-insurance/CP-8697-social-engineering-fraud.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33RL-L569] (“That is why Travelers is offering an endorsement with a social 
engineering fraud insuring agreement for Wrap+ and Executive Choice+ Fidelity and Crime coverages. 
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interpretation maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,151 the lack 
of specific policy language purporting to cover phishing attacks 
supports the interpretation that such attacks are not covered, meaning 
the insurer and insured alike could not “reasonably have expected  
this provision to cover” BECs at the time of contract formation.152 
 
C. Same and Different Results Under This Proposal 
Following the “direct is direct” approach tends to narrowly 
interpret the sequence of events that may transpire and still provide 
for computer fraud coverage.153 Yet, when “direct [means] direct” in 
the policy language, a “temporally remote” loss is necessarily 
excluded.154 Employing the Eleventh Circuit’s step-by-step analysis 
to a coverage dispute helps delineate when losses are direct or 
remote. In Brightpoint, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., for 
example, Brightpoint, the plaintiff, received a known purchaser’s fax 
requesting $1.5 million worth of prepaid phone cards.155 Brightpoint 
complied but later discovered that the purchase documentation was 
fraudulent, and the cards were never recovered.156 Brightpoint then 
tendered a claim under its crime insurance policy and later brought 
suit after the insurer denied coverage.157 The court ultimately found 
for the insurer because lost property was not inside Brightpoint’s 
premises when the fraud occurred and because the fax did not 
“‘fraudulently cause[] a transfer’ of the phone cards.”158 However, 
 
 
Traditional Fidelity and Crime insurance policies often limit losses to fraud schemes that a business is 
unaware of and is not an active participant in the scheme. This endorsement specifically extends 
coverage to include instances of social engineering fraud perpetrated by a purported vendor, client, 
employee or authorized person.”). 
151. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, supra note 62. 
152. Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 656 F. App’x 332, 333 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
153. Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 665, 674 (6th Cir. 2012). 
154. Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 935 (11th Cir. 2018); Tooling, 
Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 674. 
155. Brightpoint, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:04-CV-2085-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 693377, at *2– 
3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006). 
156. Id. at *3. 
157. Id. at *1. 
158. Id. at *6–7. 
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the temporal causation analysis could have produced similar results 
as well. 
In Brightpoint, the plaintiff received the fraudulent fax at step 
one.159 At step two, Brightpoint sent an employee to a separate 
company from which Brightpoint purchased its phone cards.160 This 
company employee then turned the phone cards over to the  
fraudulent buyer at step three.161 It is at this point that Brightpoint  
lost control of the property, and thus the loss did not flow directly 
from the fraudulent fax at step one.162 Other cases are similarly 
illustrative. 
Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of 
America  involved  a  seafood  importer  who  was  defrauded  out  of 
$713,890 when a hacker, posing as a vendor, requested new wire 
instructions via spoofed emails.163 The court found a voluntary 
transfer provision controlling, but the temporal causation analysis 
would have sufficed as well.164 In this case, Aqua Star received the 
fraudulent emails at step one.165 The recipient employee, following 
company protocol, then “printed out a copy of the spreadsheet [with 
the fraudulent wiring instructions therein] and included it in a 
package of documents that was presented to a member of Aqua Star’s 
 
159. Id. at *2 (“On both January 23 and 24, 2003, by facsimile, Brightpoint received copies of 
purchase orders, post-dated checks, and bank guaranties believed to be from or authorized by Genato.”). 
160. Id. (“After Brightpoint received these faxed documents on both January 23 and 24, 2003, it sent 
an employee, Jay-Jay N. Moralde, to the main office of Globe Telecom (‘Globe’), the company from 
which Brightpoint purchased the cards to be distributed to Genato.”). 
161. Brightpoint, 2006 WL 693377, at *2 (“At a location just outside Globe’s building, and after 
receipt of the originals of the post-dated checks and bank guaranties that had earlier been faxed to 
Brightpoint, Moralde turned over the phone cards he had purchased from Globe. The exchange was 
made with Reena Aldeguer, a person who had attended other similar exchanges and who was believed  
to be a representative of Genato.”). 
162. Id. at *7. 
163. Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. C14-1368RSL, 2016 WL 
3655265, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2016), aff’d, 719 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2018). 
164. Aqua Star, 719 F. App’x at 702 (“Exclusion G unambiguously provides that the policy ‘will not 
apply to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of Electronic Data by a natural 
person having the authority to enter the Insured’s Computer System[.]’ Aqua Star’s losses resulted from 
employees authorized to enter its computer system changing wiring information and sending four 
payments to a fraudster’s account. These employees ‘ha[d] the authority to enter’ Aqua Star’s system 
when they ‘input’ Electronic Data, on Aqua Star computers, to change the wiring information and 
authorize the four wires. Their conduct fits squarely within the Exclusion. While other contractual 
exclusions may also bar coverage in this case, we need not go any further.”) (citations omitted). 
165. Aqua Star, 2016 WL 3655265, at *1. 
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management for approval of the payment.”166 This constituted step 
two. At step three, presumably following management’s approval,  
the employee completed “four payments to a fraudster’s account.”167 
Here, again, an intervening step between the fraud and the loss would 
have provided a sufficient basis to deny coverage under the computer 
fraud provision, irrespective of any policy exclusions. 
Under this proposal, American Tooling Center, Inc. v. Travelers 
Casualty and Surety Co. of America would come out differently. In 
American Tooling Center, the court noted that the plaintiff “received 
the fraudulent email at step one.”168 Yet, the “internal actions” of the 
employees that ultimately authorized the wire transfer were not 
deemed to be intervening steps between the email at step one and the 
loss of the funds at the final step.169 A better approach is to classify 
the phishing attack from beginning to end and determine the steps 
involved to get from the fraudster’s initial attack to the ultimate loss 
of control of the property or money. Any steps between these two 
points in time, whether inside or outside the company, would sever 
the causal relationship and not be a direct loss under the policy. 
This strict policy interpretation appears to favor insurers on its 
face, but in practice it would promote insured awareness and 
diligence in identifying coverage gaps. Tying back to accountability, 
this approach would put insureds on notice regarding their security 
policies and how the steps between initiation and completion of a 
phishing attack may preclude computer fraud coverage. However, 
upon receipt of a suspicious email or other electronic communication, 
the policy holder will ideally discover and thwart the attack ahead of 
any loss—as prompted by the courts’ uniform application of a 
computer fraud policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166. Id. at *3. 
167. Aqua Star, 719 F. App’x at 702. 
168. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2018). 
169. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Insurance companies and policy holders face an uncertain future 
given the bombardment of new and emerging cyber threats. 
Sophisticated email phishing attacks in particular have cost 
businesses hundreds of thousands, even millions, of dollars in 
fraudulent wire transfers.170 Coverage decisions under a computer 
fraud policy have (to this point) been inconsistent in the federal 
circuit courts. To resolve this circuit split, a uniform interpretation is 
proposed that fosters the insured’s threat detection and prevention 
and keeps with traditional readings of insurance policies. These 
factors can work in parallel to keep businesses safe and encourage 
harmony and—importantly—predictability between insurer and 
insured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170. Matthews, supra note 28. 
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